Liberal Realism

Hillaroius comment on the US foreign policy on Pakistan

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The Economist: Pentagon 2.0

A daring punt

Apr 8th 2009 
From The Economist print edition

Robert Gates changes the Pentagon's priorities

MORE men at the expense of machines; more drones rather than top-end fighter jets and future bombers; more helicopters for combat troops rather than a replacement for the presidential chopper; more coastal vessels and fewer aircraft-carriers; better cyberdefences, but scaled-back missile defences and laser weapons. In short, the new American defence budget would spend more on today's wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and less to stave off future threats from China or Russia.

The proposals have delighted those who think America will fight irregular "small wars" for the foreseeable future, and horrified those who believe it must be ready to fight big conventional ones. John McCain thinks the 2010 budget is "a major step in the right direction". But a fellow Republican senator, James Inhofe of Oklahoma, muttered of "disarming America".

That is stretching the point. With a defence budget request of $534 billion next year (a 4% increase on this year), plus $130 billion for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama administration is hardly cutting defence. But the priorities outlined on April 6th have the fervour of a new administration determined to do things differently—except that the man at the top is the man who ran the Pentagon in the last Bush years, Robert Gates.

How to explain the transformation in "Gates 2.0" as some pundits now call the defence secretary? To begin with, Mr Gates has spent the past two years trying to avert military failure, first in Iraq and now in Afghanistan, rather than taking on powerful constituencies over contracts for expensive equipment. He has given notice for nearly a year that the Pentagon's spending priorities would have to change to support its new emphasis on counter-insurgency. Moreover, the financial crisis means that America will not be able to spend more to equip itself both for small wars and for big ones. Mr Gates says the budget is "one of those rare chances to match virtue to necessity, to critically and ruthlessly separate appetites from real requirements". See article

 

The end of the “military industrial complex”?.....naaaa don’t think so

Interesting article from the Economist, march 21/09, called In the Line of Fire:

EXPERIENCE suggests that shares in defence companies can offer a safe haven for investors during periods of economic turbulence. During the previous two recessions, American defence shares outperformed the market. That is not surprising: more than any other industry, defence is a client of government. And governments set military budgets according to their involvement in wars and their perception of external threats—neither of which has much connection with the business cycle.

But in this downturn, something different is going on. So far this year the S&P 500 index has fallen by 14%, but defence shares have fallen by 22%. The cloud hanging over the industry is the gloomy conviction that after eight years of George Bush, during which the Pentagon's budget more than doubled to $666 billion, Barack Obama is determined to change things.

The reduction in spending is not exactly imminent. The budget for 2010, which will be announced next month, was largely set by the outgoing administration and will be close to 2009's $654 billion. Because of the winding down of operations in Iraq, the Office of Management and Budget currently expects a 4% increase in base funding over 2009—not exactly short rations. It is what will happen in the subsequent years that is worrying the industry.

He has not gone into specifics, but in the past few weeks Mr Obama has given glimpses of his thinking. At a White House fiscal-responsibility summit on February 23rd, he singled out the project to produce a new presidential helicopter as "an example of the procurement process gone amok", and assured his former rival, John McCain, that curbing procurement excesses was one his most urgent priorities. The next day, in a speech to Congress, Mr Obama promised to "reform our defence budget so that we're not paying for Cold War-era weapons systems we don't use."

On March 4th he went further. Citing a recent report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which found that 95 big weapons contracts were over budget by a total of $295 billion, he contrasted projects "designed to keep the American people safe" with those "designed to make a defence contractor rich."

Adding congressional firepower to the president's statement of intent is a bill introduced in February by Carl Levin, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Mr McCain, the committee's senior Republican. Its aim is to force the Pentagon to get tough with military contractors that fail to deliver the goods.

It seems clear that Mr Obama is willing to scale back or scrap projects that are of decreasing relevance to America's 21st-century security requirements, or have become embarrassing money pits. The VH-71 programme to replace the helicopters used to carry presidents around certainly falls into the embarrassing category. Lockheed Martin and its partner Augusta Westland, a subsidiary of Italy's Finmeccanica, are on course to supply 28 helicopters at a cost to taxpayers of $13.2 billion.

But more important are the really big-ticket items that are likely to face much tougher scrutiny under the new regime. The air force would like a second batch of F-22 fighters to add to the 187 it will already have by 2011. But after spending more than $62 billion so far on the Lockheed Martin/Boeing plane, spectacularly capable though it is, Mr Obama and Congress may decide that enough is enough. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is another programme that looks vulnerable. The GAO said this month that the total investment to acquire 2,456 planes and support them in service will exceed $1 trillion.

The GAO and the Pentagon are also at odds over the army's $159 billion Future Combat Systems (FCS) project, led by Boeing and SAIC, a systems integrator. The GAO reckons FCS is running about $21 billion over budget, and said last week that the programme had "spent about 60% of its development funds, even though the most expensive activities remain to be done before the production decision". Nobody would be surprised if Mr Obama opted for a cheaper, later and less ambitious version of FCS. The same applies to missile defence, only more so—Mr Obama is a declared sceptic about the whole idea.

Defence firms still have some attractions for investors. As Noah Poponak of Goldman Sachs points out, most have strong balance-sheets and cashflow, and the geopolitical landscape is no less threatening. And shares of European defence firms have not been hit as hard as those in America. Having largely missed out on Mr Bush's party, they are facing less of a hangover now. But with a military budget almost as big as the rest of the world's combined, even quite small changes in American defence spending have big consequences for the industry. Military spending moves in long cycles. After ten fat years, some lean ones are in store.

Chris Blattman Blog: US Militaries spend foreign aid

The U.S. military spends a quarter of foreign aid

The Washington Post reports on the militarization of U.S. foreign aid:

The Pentagon, which controlled about 3 percent of official aid money a decade ago, now controls 22 percent, while the U.S. Agency for International Development's share has declined from 65 percent to 40 percent, according to the 56-page report.

The report, by Refugees International, is here.

I've worried about the increasing influence of the armed forces in development before. But let me stress that I think much of that spending is well placed. From the same Post article:

For example, the United States has dedicated nearly $50 million to hire contractors to train 2,000 soldiers in post-civil war Liberia, a West African country of 4 million people. Meanwhile, $5.5 million has been dedicated to boosting a weak and unprofessional army of 164,000 soldiers in Congo, a country of 65 million where a decade-long conflict and humanitarian crisis have left an estimated 5 million people dead.

Professionalization of African armies is much needed, and could be aid dollars well spent. But should the military be responsible for 22 percent of foreign aid? It's hard to imagine why.

WSJ: Secrets contractors are not under any scrutiny

Iraq Case Sheds Light
On Secret Contractors

By SIOBHAN GORMAN and AUGUST COLE
July 17, 2008

When Dave Boone complained that his fellow security contractors in Iraq were stockpiling weapons and padding their expense reports, his company talked him out of quitting and promised to run a tighter ship.

Later, Mr. Boone reported that colleagues guarding U.S. spy personnel had fired shots into a Baghdad neighborhood and falsely claimed they defeated a horde of snipers. This time, the company fired him -- though two of its people backed up Mr. Boone's account. He has spent more than three years trying to get U.S. officials to investigate the incident.

Security contractors in Iraq have been in an intense spotlight since employees of another firm, Blackwater Worldwide, were involved in a shooting incident last fall that left 17 Iraqi civilians dead, leading to a Justice Department investigation and efforts by the Iraqi government to clamp down on their actions. Overall, the U.S. has about the same number of contractors as military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan.

But a fast-growing type of government contracting largely escapes such scrutiny: secret programs, or "black" contracts, assisting intelligence agents as they operate in war zones. These contractors have carried out some of the government's most sensitive work -- conducting interrogations, manning secret prisons and guarding spy-agency personnel. The programs' existence, size and scope are classified, and so are the details of their troubles.

HIDDEN PROTECTION

   

•  The Company: MVM has quickly grown to become one of the top providers of secret security to the CIA and NSA in Iraq and Afghanistan.

•  What's Happened: MVM has faced multiple charges from employees of mismanaging contracts, but according to former managers, it has not addressed the issues.

•  What's at Stake: Such secret programs, or 'black' contracts, often escape scrutiny because of their classified nature.

The House of Representatives Wednesday passed a broad bill tackling a wide range of intelligence policy issues, including tightening oversight of such contractors. It would force intelligence agencies to keep Congress better informed about their use as well as any formal probes into wrongdoing. But the legislation faces serious headwinds: The White House threatened a veto Wednesday, arguing that some of the provisions would hamper its spying operations.

Mr. Boone's little-known employer, MVM Inc., before 2001 mainly provided school and courthouse guards in U.S. cities. As the U.S. sought to supplant its own overstretched forces, MVM quickly grew to become one of the top few providers of secret security in Iraq and Afghanistan, alongside companies including Blackwater. MVM has handled much of the Central Intelligence Agency's and National Security Agency's personal security in war zones.

CIA Station

It's hard to assess the total of intelligence workers in Iraq because the numbers are classified. In addition to the 150,000 troops in Iraq, Baghdad has become the CIA's largest station overseas with officers estimated in the hundreds. The NSA, the super-secret electronic eavesdropping service, has significantly expanded its presence in Iraq.

MVM's entry into the security elite has been rocky. Mr. Boone is suing the firm over his firing after the 2004 shooting incident, which occurred after his team, while guarding NSA personnel, was hit with a car bomb. Mr. Boone contends the firm let him go rather than address a pattern of hazardous field management in the program, dubbed "Scorpion."

Scorpion team members, including Dave Boone at center, in Baghdad.

In court papers from the case, in federal district court in Colorado, MVM responds to Mr. Boone's claims about the shooting incident by saying the company "is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations...and therefore denies those allegations." A federal district court ruled against Mr. Boone's claim of wrongful termination on technical grounds; Mr. Boone is appealing.

Documents from the court case and other interviews provide a rare look into the troubles of MVM's classified security contracts. Other employees and managers have written detailed critiques of company operations. A member of the Scorpion team wrote lengthy notes about poor training, procedures and equipment. Two managers of another MVM program for the CIA -- a program then known as "Viper" -- wrote of similar problems there and said they got no response.

MVM, which had no comment on the managers' letter, has repeatedly been warned by U.S. officials that it hasn't provided adequate personnel under its contracts. MVM recently learned it could lose a big chunk of its Viper operation, now renamed "Panther," to rivals that have been invited to bid for it.

MVM MEMO

   

In August of 2004, Daniel Elissalde -- who worked for U.S. security contractor MVM and was a member of a project team called Scorpion -- sent a 16-page memo to the company's management. He later quit the company. Read edited excerpts of the memo.

The company's difficulties aren't unique, although its larger competitors can more easily absorb these kinds of problems. All firms face a finite number of highly skilled ex-soldiers, leaving many short of qualified personnel. Others have struggled to meet government standards because they're new to working in war zones. Contracting in a war zone is also an inherently unpredictable venture.

In an interview, MVM's chief executive, Dario Marquez, said the government has been satisfied with MVM's work. "We have a great working relationship with both these clients," he said, referring to the CIA and NSA. To buttress that point, MVM showed The Wall Street Journal a handwritten, favorable NSA review of the Scorpion program. But Mr. Marquez acknowledged that MVM, along with its rivals, has had personnel problems.

"Every contractor has a harder time finding these qualified people," he says. The NSA declined to comment about its experience with MVM, as did the CIA and the State Department.

MVM, of McLean, Va., was started in 1979 by three former Secret Service agents, who named the outfit with the first letter of each of their last names. Mr. Marquez bought out the other two and built a company specializing in protecting buildings. Shortly after the terror attacks of 9/11, the company's security business boomed. Demand for its domestic protection work soared as government buildings of all types sought more guards and gates.

The firm started to seek more overseas work and landed contracts with the Army and the Justice Department, the latter to protect scientists examining mass graves in Iraq. The company says its classified contracts for overseas intelligence operations have grown to represent 30% of the company's quick-rising revenue, bringing in $60 million last year. The company says it hopes to triple that total within five years. But MVM has run into problems with the way it manages both of its major classified programs.

In the runup to the Iraq war, MVM won the Viper contract, providing security for CIA officers overseas. After 18 months, some of its managers began to write MVM officials about problems. Two managers complained of poorly trained personnel, unresponsive senior management and weapons that went missing, in excerpts seen by the Journal. MVM Chief Financial Officer Joseph Morway attributes any equipment issues to "start-up" problems and declines to comment on the managers' letters.

In a deposition for Mr. Boone's lawsuit, a former Viper manager named Mark Adams said, "They couldn't keep track of their equipment, they didn't have an accounting system for it, they couldn't get their bills paid." The 15-year CIA protective-services veteran added, "In my opinion, they were putting people in harm's way out there...We had written several reports on the memos on these issues, and they were not well received."

Hurt by Turnover

MVM received CIA warnings about inadequate personnel on Viper in 2004 and again last year after the agency ratcheted up requirements that MVM had to meet, said current and former MVM managers. The program has been hurt by turnover, going through about 10 program managers during the past five years, three former managers said. Mr. Marquez discounted the significance of the turnover, saying that the "backbone of the company" was a group of experienced senior managers.

RELATED DOCUMENTS

   

• Read Dave Boone's complaint against MVM for wrongful termination and MVM's response.

• Read the official MVM after-action report from Nov. 20, 2004.

• Read Dave Boone's after-action report from the same incident.

• Read Mickey Johnson's version of events.

• Read MVM emails about the NSA judgment in the case and about Mr. Boone's termination.

• Read Mr. Boone's email to MVM CEO Dario Marquez.

• Read the NSA's repsonse to an inquiry from the office of Sen. Ted Stevens.

• Read the U.S. District Court of Colorado's decision in MVM's favor.

To rapidly fill empty slots, two former managers say, MVM has been offering bonuses in the tens of thousands of dollars to new hires, even for short-term commitments -- and even as it has reduced the daily pay it offers. Mr. Morway acknowledged that MVM and other companies have to offer bonuses to qualified applicants because "the pool is shrinking," yet competition for government contracts has lowered the pay they can offer. "There's pressure to bring down those salaries," he said.

Late last month, the CIA decided to rebid the bulk of MVM's contract -- one of MVM's biggest, say former managers. Blackwater and a small Nevada-based firm, SOC Inc., also currently have portions of the contract. Mr. Morway described the CIA's offer to other firms to split the work as a way to make staffing the program easier for the government and his company. Two former managers said the unusual move came after MVM regularly delivered between five to 30 fewer guards than required. Mr. Morway said that the company did have challenges meeting the staffing requirements but subsequently addressed them.

The State Department terminated a nonclassified MVM contract guarding the U.S. embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, in 2005, citing inadequate personnel in that case as well. Among the issues: The firm provided a crew of Peruvian guards who couldn't speak sufficient English, Mr. Marquez acknowledges. He says the State Department couldn't give MVM enough time to correct the problem. The State Department terminated the contract "for convenience," language that permitted MVM to win other federal contracts.

Mr. Boone first joined MVM in March 2004 for the Scorpion contract providing security in Iraq for NSA personnel. A 20-year veteran of the Army's Special Forces and an experienced sniper with tours in El Salvador and Bosnia, Mr. Boone retired from the Army in 1998 and began work as a contractor.

His first rotation in Scorpion didn't go well. He complained that teammates filed for reimbursement from the government for items they hadn't purchased, and stockpiled assault weapons. In a deposition, John Hickman, who later took over managing the Scorpion program and eased some people out, said many on the team at the time "weren't qualified. They were living a big lie; they were on a magic carpet ride."

Mr. Boone quit in June 2004. That summer, teammate Daniel Elissalde wrote a 16-page memo to MVM detailing his own concerns about Scorpion, saying that MVM's armored-car convoys traveled too close together, leaving them too vulnerable to attack; personnel obtained weapons on the black market and lacked night-vision goggles; and vehicles had chronic, basic problems such as broken door handles.

"I am now using the string attached to the keys to pull the door open," Mr. Elissalde wrote. "Sort of inconvenient but during the last rocket attack I did manage to get out of the car in reasonably quick time." He also wrote that NSA officials had learned of weapons stockpiling and told MVM contractors to stop. Then, like Mr. Boone, he quit.

MVM owned up to some of the problems Mr. Boone raised. Former Scorpion program manager Louis Sengebush described in a deposition how MVM addressed Mr. Boone's complaints and asked him to return. "We knew...he was experienced," he said. "He was a straight-up guy and I trusted him." Mr. Boone returned that September, thinking the problems were fixed, but they continued, he says.

Then on Nov. 20, 2004, as the Scorpion team returned from the Baghdad airport after dropping off an NSA officer, Mr. Boone and his five teammates were hit head-on by a car laden with explosives. The single blast totaled the team's two vehicles, as Mr. Elissalde had warned could happen. According to Mr. Boone and a report by teammate Mickey Johnson, the only potential enemy in the area was a young man whom Mr. Johnson said he ordered to the ground.

One teammate began firing indiscriminately into a nearby neighborhood, the two men say, and ceased only when an Army unit arrived at the scene. It was unclear whether anyone was hit. The Army says it cannot find its report on the incident.

Two team members produced what would become the firm's official "after-action" report for the NSA, complete with diagrams. It said the team was ambushed by between 20 and 30 enemy snipers whom they fended off, killing three of the enemy and wounding seven more.

Team leader Mike Pietragallo wrote a similar report to the agency, but in his deposition for the Boone case he said he didn't see any snipers. He didn't respond to requests for comment. The authors of the official report couldn't be reached.

Claims of Coverup

Mr. Boone contends the report was a coverup meant to camouflage incompetence. In January 2005 he took his concerns to MVM's upper management. Bruce Tully, then a senior MVM manager at the time, conducted an investigation, according to Mr. Tully's deposition. He concluded Mr. Boone's version of events was the most credible.

Of the official report, Mr. Tully said in his deposition, "My personal and professional opinion is, I just don't believe this." Photos of the vehicles showed no bullet holes, he pointed out. No further records have surfaced of the Iraqi casualties or captives the report describes.

MVM's Mr. Marquez says the matter of the disputed report "was adjudicated" by MVM and the NSA, but wouldn't say how or provide further details. "I'm not going to tell you what's accurate and what wasn't," he says, adding the matter was mainly up to the NSA to resolve.

The NSA says it's up to the company. Mr. Boone got no response from the agency when he tried to report his concerns to its inspector general. The agency wrote Alaska Republican Sen. Ted Stevens, whose office tried to intercede for Mr. Boone, that it wouldn't pursue the matter, which it called an employer-employee dispute.

In February, Judge Edward W. Nottingham of the federal district court in Colorado ruled against Mr. Boone's claim of wrongful termination on technical grounds. Mr. Boone is appealing. The Pentagon's inspector general began a preliminary review in May. The office of Rep. Henry Waxman, the California Democrat who is chairman of a powerful House watchdog committee, initially didn't respond to Mr. Boone, but recently a spokeswoman said the office was opening a "preliminary investigation."

The US Embassador to Colombia on the attack of Ecuadorian territory by Colombian forces

This is a very weak argument, full of falacies and common places, to back the attack perpetrated by Colombian forces on Ecuadorian territory that resulted in the killing if 17 FARC members. Mr. Embassador talks about balancing self-depense principle v. territorial sovereignty principle. FALLACY. The Colombians were not acting in self-defense, 17 sleep persons not planning to attack inmediatly are not inminent threat to nobody. In normal situations they would call that same act summary executions, not a military act.

 

Collin Powell on the future of Irak

Solana´s speech on the future of EU´s Foreign Policy

This is a speech, given by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, called "Europe in the World: Next Steps". You may read also the analysis of it made on Global Power EU blog. And I think it would be really interesting to compare it to what Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, says about the future of US Foreign Policy on her recent article "Rethinking the National Interest", published in Foreign Affairs. I will get back to this as soon as I get time to the make the comparison my selves. But I can say in advanced that they both talk about the rise of Asia as some kind of threat to the west.

The lies media told about Irak

The problems with hawks is not that their theoretical background may be wrong or not. The problem with them is not their values or their ideology. The problem is that they lead US to fight a war on completely false statements about the circumstances with which they constructed their arguments. There is a process full of lies. So, the discussion is not about if US should fight terrorist and prevent any attack by punching first, is that is the only response available to neutralize the enemy. The problem is that, in Irak, there was no threat, no necessity to start a war, nothing to prevent, nor talibans o WMDs. Check this interview, made by the Center for Public Integrity, were Lee H. Hamilton talks about how the US government manipulated public opinion.

Global Power Europe Blog: France´s New defense strategy

France’s strategic defence review: leading the debate

Guest article by Luis Simón Navarro

On Tuesday morning, President Nicolas Sarkozy presented in Paris a new strategy of security and defence for the next fifteen years, before an audience of some 3500 people, including military officials, police officers, diplomats and other civil servants, experts and journalists. The publication of France’s Livre Blanc pour la défense et la sécurité nationale comes at an appropriate moment: a good six months before the expiration of Javier Solana’s deadline to come up with a revision of the European Security Strategy, only two weeks before France’s takeover of the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, and at the very early stages of the deliberations aimed at providing NATO with a new Strategic Concept—expected next year in the Alliance’s sixtieth anniversary summit, to be held in Strasbourg and Kehl. A new American administration will be in place by January 2009 and the European Union seems on track (Dublin forbid) for giving itself the necessary instruments—mainly in the realm of the Common Foreign and Security Policy—to tackle the challenges of the twenty-first century more coherently, robustly and effectively.

Indeed, it is a good time for strategic reflection. For one thing, the hindsight of time, and the (ongoing) lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq, have contributed to a better understanding of the nature of the new puzzles that arose from the smoke of the Islamist attacks on 11th September 2001. Furthermore, the current instability in financial markets—partly rooted in the important disruptions in the chain of global energy supplies—and the, largely related, alterations in the European and global balances of power (i.e. the resurgence of Russia or the rise of Asia) are notable developments that deserve careful strategic reflection.

France’s new Livre Blanc replaces a previous strategy from 1994, and provides a guiding framework for the country’s foreign, security and defence policy over the next fifteen years. The deepening of globalisation and subsequent growing interdependence, resulting in rapid and considerable transformations in the strategic environment, are highlighted throughout the new strategy. Arguably, one of the most noticeable features of the Livre Blanc is the absence of a cut-clear, one-stop threat to the security of France and its allies. Instead, the density of the current strategic landscape derives from the coexistence of the new post-Cold War, post-11th September threats with the kind of old challenges from which Europeans thought they had moved away only fourteen years ago.

Particularly alarming is the emphasis placed on Europe’s relative decline in international affairs, a decline illustrated by a substantial shift in global geopolitical and economic attention towards Asia or the challengingly growing protagonism of Russia on the European scene. Today and tomorrow’s challenges are inherently entwined and multidimensional: a blurring distinction between the internal and external dimensions of security; the evil triangle of terrorism, failed states and weapons of mass destruction proliferation; energy scarcity (a challenge whose European dimension the document particularly emphasises); organised crime; threats to cyber security; the emergence of global pandemics; and the advance of global warming.

According to Louis Gautier, the defence advisor to former French Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, and national delegate for strategic affairs in the Socialist Party, the Livre Blanc feeds a narrowly conceived paradigm of the world, one dominated by the West’s fears. As he says, in this mindset, ‘international security will result from arms superiority, the effectiveness of protection systems and the unity of the West.’[1] Regrettably, Gautier contends, the spirit of the Livre Blanc propels a pessimistic attitude: alternative options such as the promotion of multilateral schemes for disarmament or the strengthening of international regulation simply do not qualify as credible means for delivering French security. This emerging paradigm is not just a consequence of the growing disillusion with dreams such as The end of History, but is also a source for uploading suspicion and lack of confidence into the international system over the years to come. This is the ‘security dilemma’ in action.

For the Livre Blanc, the world’s growing volatility calls out for a flexible strategy: entwined and multidimensional challenges require comprehensive solutions. It says that more coherence is needed between military, diplomatic, economic and other civilian means, but also between and among partners, the various regional and international organisations or other elements of global civil society. The Livre Blanc proclaims prevention, deterrence, protection and intervention as France’s core strategic functions. Particularly recurring is the theme of prevention and the corresponding emphasis on the acquisition and distribution of information—a concept the French used to refer to as intelligence. It is in this sense that we can understand the substantial budgetary increase in the field of satellite communications and other space-based assets—from the current figure of €380 million to over €700 million in the next few years.

Possible concerns with a potential activation of more traditional (inter-state) conflicts are well covered by the continuing accent on independent nuclear deterrence—the ultimate guarantee of France’s protecion. Finally, the ongoing globalisation of security challenges puts a premium on attributes such as deployability and readiness; on intervention. This explains the envisaged reductions of personnel—a cut of 54,000 over the next six to seven years—and assets restructuring in the armed forces (i.e. rationalisation of military facilities in French territory). The direct target behind the restructuring is to reverse the current ratio—sixty percent of the French defence budget and assets are devoted to logistics and maintenance and forty percent to operational punch—in order to close the gap with Britain’s armed forces, were those figures are reversed. Finally, the absence of a decision over the construction of a second aircraft carrier for the Marine nationale is perhaps the most notable news in the realm of capabilities.

The Livre Blanc identifies a ‘geographic axis of strategic priority’, namely the strategic corridor that connects the Euro-Atlantic space with the Indian Ocean. The new geographic axis runs from metropolitan France, through the Mediterranean and the Gulf, and on into the Indian Ocean. Special importance is also given to Western and sub-Saharan Africa, areas in which the French have traditionally played an active role and remain currently engaged. Such an explicit reference to a strategic geographic axis represents, arguably, a step backwards from a (alleged) prior global focus that today seems financially unattainable. Most significantly, the new French strategy seems to ignore Latin America, as well as the same Asia that the document catalogues as the strategic locus of the twenty-first century.

France’s ‘Geographic Axis of Strategic Priority’

Regarding France’s vociferated reintegration into NATO’s military structure, the new strategy puts emphasis on the fact that the announced move is just part of a wider pattern of cooperation between France and NATO that goes back to the early-mid 1990s. Such a pattern is best illustrated by France’s return to the Alliance’s military committee in 1996, or Paris’ active participation in NATO missions.[2] Unsurprisingly, not everyone is happy: it is this very issue that the French Socialists have attacked, given the scepticism that the noises of a comeback triggers both within France’s administration and the country’s public opinion at large.

Last and, most certainly, not least is l’Europe. Europe and the European Union play a pivotal role throughout the Livre Blanc, for which it is almost impossible to conceive a French strategy without a European strategy. The document pays special tribute to the historical character of the Franco-German couple as the driving force behind European integration, but also points to the Franco-British connection as an indispensable asset in the road towards the consolidation of the European Union as an international power and security provider.

Down at the level of specifics, the document advances, in a rather raw form, some of President Sarkozy’s ambitious proposals for the further development of European Security and Defence Policy: first, the need to boost Europe’s autonomous capabilities for effective crisis management (including the creation of a Permanent Headquarters in Brussels for the planning and command of European operations); second, the creation of a European strategic reserve force of some 60,000 personnel with the required naval and aerial components; third, a reinforcement of the mechanisms for common funding for European operations; fourth, the establishment of European schemes for training military and civilian personnel; fifth, the rationalisation of Europe’s defence industry; sixth, an expansion of the Union’s functions in the realm of security beyond crisis management, such as common defence (notably strengthening the internal dimension of European security); and finally, the call for a European Defence White Book. Interesting times certainly await Europeans with France’s upcoming presidency of the European Union!

[1] Le Monde, 19th June 2008 (own translation).
[2] On France’s relationship with NATO after the end of the Cold War see: Frédéric Bozo, ‘Alliance atlantique: la fin de l’exception française?’, Document de Travail (Paris: Fondation pour l’Innovation Politique), February 2008.

Luis Simón Navarro, EFSPS Scholar, is completing his Ph.D. in French and European defence policy at Royal Holloway, University of London. He is currently a guest researcher at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique in Paris.